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Ten states, primarily from Central and Eastern Europe, are likely to be admitted to the 
EU within the next few years.  The present paper assesses the competitiveness 
implications of this enlargement for Ireland.  Four specific topics are considered: the 
trade effects, the implications for Ireland￿s ability to attract FDI, the likely levels of 
immigration from Central and Eastern Europe and its consequences, and the budgetary 












                                                            




   1 
Introduction 
A group of  new member states will be admitted to the EU within the next few years.  
The timing and the precise number to join in the first wave will depend on the politics of 
enlargement within the EU15 and on the progress made by the individual candidate 
countries in meeting the accession conditions.  
 
There are thirteen formal candidates for membership; ten Central and Eastern European 
countries (the CEEC10), plus Cyprus, Malta and Turkey.  Negotiations with the five CEE 
countries that opened proceedings in 1995 - the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovenia - may be completed by the end of 2002.  Another five CEE 
countries began negotiations in February 2000.  Of these, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia 
have joined the front runners, while Romania and Bulgaria lag behind.  Cyprus and Malta 
are also progressing rapidly, but the opening of negotiations with Turkey remains 
conditional on its meeting the political criteria for accession. 
 
Given the small size of the Maltese and Cypriot economies and the continuing 
uncertainty over the status of the Turkish application, economic analyses have 
concentrated on the implications of accession by the CEEC10.  This is the position 
adopted in the present paper, which seeks to evaluate the economic implications for 
Ireland of such an enlargement. 
 
Previous enlargements saw the accession of Ireland, Denmark and the UK in the 1970s, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1980s and Sweden, Finland, and Austria in the 1990s.  
Enlargement to embrace the CEE10 would raise the land mass of the EU by 33 percent, 
the EU population by 105 million (28 percent), and EU GDP (evaluated at purchasing 
power parity, or PPP) by 11 percent.  The population increase compares to the 1973 
enlargement of 31 percent.  The GDP increase of 11 percent compares to the 1986 
enlargement of 12 percent, and the land mass increase compares to each of the previous 
enlargements. 
   2 
A major difference in the present case however is the much lower level of development 
of the current candidate countries.  The per capita PPP-based GDP of the current 
applicants is 39 percent of that of the existing EU-15, compared to an equivalent figure of 
61.5 percent for the much smaller accessions (in population terms) of the 1980s.  By 
contrast, the enlargements of the 1970s and 1990s barely affected average incomes. 
 
The economic effects on incumbents of these earlier enlargements pale in comparison to 
the likely consequences of the accession of the CEEC10, because of this large income 
difference and because of the size of the agricultural sector in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  Enlargement will double the number of EU farmers and increase the area under 
agricultural production by one-third. 
 
These structural differences imply that the Common Agricultural Policy and the 
Structural Funds programmes must be modified if the budgetary costs of enlargement are 
to be contained.  While the budgetary implications loom large in the general European 
policy debate, however, the welfare consequences over the longer term are likely to be 
dominated by the increased trade and factor flows to which  enlargement will give rise.  
Because of the relative sizes of the two groups of economies, the economic effects of 
enlargement will be much more profound for the CEEC10 than for any of the current 
incumbents.  Amongst incumbents, the strongest aggregate-demand and immigration 
effects at least are likely to be felt by the Western states that border the CEEC.   
 
Enlargement will nevertheless have important implications for Ireland. It will  open up 
new opportunities for Irish businesses in terms of exporting, outsourcing and outward 
foreign direct investment (FDI).  Ireland￿s foreign-owned sector will also benefit from 
the expansion of trade, though the  environment in which the country competes for 
inward FDI will become more competitive.  Enlargement  will also open up the 
possibility of labour migration from CEE countries.  Most of the current EU15 member 
states are likely to phase this in over a ten-year transition period, on the assumption that 
continuing convergence in living standards between the CEEC and the EU15 will reduce 
the desirability of migration.  The current stance of the Irish authorities is that no such   3 
impediments to labour mobility will be raised, though they retain the right to review this  
position should labour-market conditions change.  
 
The present paper deals with each of these issues in turn.  Section 1 considers the trade 
effects and assesses the opportunities afforded by enlargement for outsourcing and 
outward investment.  Section 2 considers the implications for Ireland￿s foreign-owned 
sector and for the country￿s ability to continue to attract technologically-advanced foreign 
industry. Section 3 analyses the likely pattern of migration flows and its consequences, 
and Section 4 assesses the implications of enlargement for both the EU budget, as it 
impacts on Ireland, and for the Irish exchequer.    
 
1.  Trade, Outsourcing and Outward FDI 
Ireland currently trades over 40 times as much with the rest of the EU as it does with the 
CEEC10, as shown in Table 1.  Yet the EU economy is only 20 times larger than the 
CEEC10 when evaluated in nominal terms, which is the correct measure to be used in 
this comparison.  This summary measure suggests that there are large trading 
opportunities yet to be exploited.
1  
 
Ireland￿s main trading partners among the CEEC are Hungary, Poland and the Czech 
Republic.  Trade with each of the other states, and with Malta and Cyprus, is very small 
by comparison.  Ireland runs a trade surplus with most countries other than Hungary, with 
which it has a large deficit that is driven largely by imports of Office and Data Processing 
parts and equipment, a perhaps surprising point that will be discussed in further detail 
later.
2 
                                                            
1 Brulhart and Kelly (1999), however, using a gravity model to take account of trade barriers represented by 
distance and other factors, find that the potential for trade expansion is relatively modest unless the 
forecasted partial income convergence of the CEECs on the EU is factored in. 
 
2 It also tends to run a very much smaller deficit with Latvia, largely driven by imports of Wood and 
Petroleum Products.   4 
 
Table 1: Irish Trade with CEE Countries and with the rest of the EU 
 
 £  million       
  1999 1999  2000  2000 
  Exports Imports  Exports  Imports 
Poland 199  69  284  81 
Czech Rep  154  49  273  86 
Hungary 128  192  177  231 
Rest of CEE  105  58  200  109 
Total EU      40296  23667 
CEE/EU     43  47 
Source: CSO Trade Statistics 
 
 
The growth in trade is also of interest.  Table 2 shows that Irish exports to the CEEC have 
grown more than 40-fold over the 1990s, while imports have grown even more rapidly.  
Irish trade relations with the region have expanded much more strongly than have the 
UK￿s for example, as the table also illustrates. 
 
 
Table 2: Growth in Trade with Eastern Europe: Ireland and the UK Compared 
 $000  $000  $mill  $mill     
  1990 1990 1999 1999  1999/1990  1999/1990 
  Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Ireland and Eastern 
Europe 
16242 3969 728.7 445.8  45  112 
UK and Eastern 
Europe 
417985 160132 4495.5  3873.6  11  24 
Source: UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook (New York) 
Note: Eastern Europe comprises a somewhat different set of countries that the CEE10, since there were no 
separate data for trade with the Baltic States for example in 1990.  
 
 
Trade liberalisation of course has sectoral as well as aggregate implications, which is the 
issue to which we now turn.  Most bilateral tariffs on manufacturing trade between the 
EU and CEEC have already been removed under the terms of the Europe Agreements, 
though impediments to trade in agriculture and food processing remain.  Accession will 
liberalise this dimension of trade and lead to the harmonisation of external tariffs.  It will 
also allow the CEE countries access to the Single European Market.    
   5 
The customs union dimension, it is generally agreed, will lead to the expansion of the  
food processing sector in CEE countries at the expense of food processing in the EU15; 
Francois and Rombout (2001), Lejour et al. (2001).  The mechanisms generating this 
prediction are as follows.  Current EU export subsidies are larger than for the CEEC.
3  
Removal of export subsidies between the two sets of states will reduce EU15 exports to 
the CEEC.  A reduction in the higher CEE external tariff on agricultural imports will 
increase the competitiveness of the CEE food processing sector, while the removal of EU 
tariffs on CEE products is anticipated to increase CEE exports to the EU15.
4  We deal 
below with the precise implications these developments might have for the Irish food 
processing sector.  
 
The second trade effect comes about as a result of CEE accession to the Single Market.  
Since this entails fiercer competition on firms￿ home markets while enhancing firms￿  
competitiveness on foreign markets, it will typically be beneficial for sectors that are 
already export-intensive.  All studies to date agreed that CEE sectors such as textiles, 
clothing and footwear stand to benefit, generally to the detriment of the Southern EU 
member states.  The major sector to expand among the EU15 is predicted to be 
Machinery and Equipment, in which the EU currently has a strong trade surplus with the 




Studies disagree on the implications for the motor vehicles and transport sector, with 
some such as Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997) suggesting that this sector will expand 
in the EU15 will gain while other such as Lejour et al. (2001) suggest that it will contract. 
The latter prediction we regard as incorrect as the Transport Equipment sector in the 
CEEC has been developed in recent years behind high tariff barriers, which will 
obviously disappear as a consequence of enlargement; Barry (2002). 
 
                                                            
3 Table 3.1 of Lejour et al. (2001). 
4 Some more disaggregated studies predict that the CEECs will gain in sectors that are abundant in land and 
unskilled labour while affording opportunities for the skill-intensive segments of the EU food processing 
sector;  Stolwijk (2000).   6 
How will the individual EU incumbent countries fare according to this preliminary 
analysis? The effects will depend on the importance of these individual sectors in each 
incumbent country. To surmount transfer-pricing problems we evaluate this in 
employment terms.  The data in Table 3 show the importance of each of these sectors in 
each country￿s manufacturing employment relative to the sector￿s importance in  overall 
EU manufacturing employment.
6  Each cell therefore measures, for sector i and country j, 























Belg+Lux 0.79  0.62  1.30  0.93 
Denmark 0.50  1.54  1.63  0.41 
Germany 1.24  1.35  0.72  0.42 
Greece 0.70  0.38  1.90  2.31 
Spain 0.81  0.60  1.43  1.29 
France 1.20  0.75  0.99  0.89 
Ireland 0.30  0.55  1.79  0.98 
Italy 0.94  1.21  0.69  1.78 
Austria 0.50  1.09  0.98  0.85 
Portugal 0.40  0.38  1.05  3.60 
Finland 0.44  1.25  1.00  0.48 
Sweden 1.30  1.30  0.83  0.15 
United Kingdom  1.02  0.83  1.19  1.05 
Netherlands 0.58  0.98  1.48 0.41 
Total EU15  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
This analysis suggests that Germany will do best as it has a strong comparative advantage 
in the EU sectors likely to expand and a low presence in the EU sectors which are likely 
to fare worst.  The Cohesion countries, on the other hand - Greece, Spain, Portugal and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 The material in this paragraph is based on Lejour et al (2001) and Baldwin et al. (1997). 
6 These data depict averages over the years 1995-97, the latest years for which the Daisie database gives 
data for the entire EU.   7 
Ireland - will fare worst according to this analysis because they have a comparative 
advantage in sectors likely to fare poorly while not having a strong presence in the 
sectors likely to fare best. 
 
Barry and Hannan (2002a) have shown however that it is important to distinguish 
between foreign and indigenous industry in such comparative advantage analyses.  If 
Ireland has a comparative advantage in some sectors because of the strong presence of 
foreign industry in the economy, this will serve as an inaccurate predictor of future 
developments in sectoral structure if the country fails to retain these foreign-owned 
sectors.   
 
Fortunately we do not need to redo the analysis for each EU country as foreign industry is 
much less important in other EU countries as it is in Ireland.
8  Replacing the numbers for 
total employment in Ireland with those for indigenous industry alone, and redoing the 
analysis generates the results reported in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4: ￿Revealed Comparative Advantage￿, 





















0.30 0.55 1.79  0.98 
Ireland 
(indigenous) 
0.41 0.53 2.48  1.03 
Source: Own calculations from Daisie database and Irish Census of Industrial Production. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 Revealed comparative advantage is conventionally measured by applying this formula to export rather 
than employment data. We use employment data to surmount the transfer pricing problems that arise in the 
Irish case, and also to allow us distinguish later between Ireland￿s indigenous and foreign sectors. 
8 Tables C.4.1 of the OECD (2001) publication  Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard, shows that 
foreign affiliates comprise 48 percent of Irish manufacturing employment.  France is next highest at 28 
percent, while the equivalent figures for the UK and Germany are 18 percent and 6 percent respectively.     8 
These adjustments show that indigenous industry has a stronger presence than foreign 
industry in the EU sectors predicted to do badly, and has a weaker presence in the heavy 
capital goods sector that analyses are agreed is the EU sector that is likely to do best  as a 
consequence of enlargement.  
 
The international  analyses from which the above sectoral predictions are drawn do not 
consider the specific circumstances of the various EU incumbents but instead treat them 
as a single group.  One important point can be made about Ireland￿s food processing 
sector however, which is, in employment terms, both the most important indigenous 
industry and the most important manufacturing sector overall.  This sector relies 
primarily on local agricultural inputs, as evidenced by the fact that it is the sector with the 
highest share of domestic materials inputs as a proportion of gross output.  This tends to 
be the case internationally also.  Irish agriculture produce is different from that in the 
CEE countries however.  The vast bulk of Irish output is of beef and dairy products, with 
cereals comprising only a small proportion.
9   In Poland, on the other hand, only 20% of 
agricultural Gross Value Added comes from livestock as opposed to crop production; in 
Hungary the figure is 25%, in Slovakia 33% and in the Czech Republic 50%.  While milk 
production (along with pork) is important in the Czech Republic furthermore, in both 
Hungary and Poland pork and poultry are the most important livestock activities; 
Henrichsmeyer et al. (2000) 
 
It can be surmised therefore that Irish and CEE food processing are not in direct 
competition.  The output of the Central European EU incumbents, on the other hand ￿ 
countries such as Germany and Austria and to a lesser extent France ￿ is similar to that of 
the CEE countries.   This is confirmed by Ferto and Hubbard (2001, page 6) who show 
that Irish-Hungarian trade in agri-food products is primarily inter-industry, as is 
Hungary￿s food trade with Italy, Spain and Greece,  while that between Hungary and 
Austria, the Netherlands, France and Germany is primarily intra-industry.  While the Irish 
sector may  suffer alongside other EU incumbents by having export subsidies withdrawn, 
                                                            
9 For Ireland, Matthews (2000) shows that, for 1999,  cattle accounted for 33% of gross agricultural output, 
milk for 35%, and crops, pigs, sheep and other for 14%, 6% , 5% and 8% respectively.   9 
therefore, the growth of the CEE sector will not damage the Irish sector nearly as much 
as it will certain other EU states. In fact, if accession yields the expected growth benefits 
to the CEE countries, Irish food processing appears well-positioned to gain.
10 
The conventional predictions that EU15 Food Processing and the Textiles, Clothing and 
Footwear sectors will suffer also ignores the possibility of strategic responses on their 
part.  We now briefly consider these issues ￿ focusing first on outward FDI and then on 
outsourcing ￿ again with a particular focus on Ireland. 
 
Table 5 shows that the major sectors accounting for overseas acquisitions by indigenous 
Irish firms are (i) Financial Services, (ii) Construction and Property, (iii) Food and 
Agribusiness and (iv) Print, Paper and Publishing. While the importance of Irish 
Financial Services firms in overseas acquisitions reflects international norms, the same 
cannot be said for the other three sectors.  Given the importance of agribusiness within 
Irish indigenous industry, where Food Drink and Tobacco accounts for 27 percent of 
indigenous manufacturing employment compared to 12 percent of total EU15 
manufacturing employment, it is not so surprising that this sector should play a greater 
role in Ireland￿s outward FDI than is the case for the rest of the EU.  The other two 
sectors, Construction and  Print, Paper and Publishing appear to play a disproportionate 
role in outward FDI from Ireland however.
11   
                                                            
10 This more detailed account of Irish food processing contradicts the simulated prediction of Lejour et al. 
(2001, page 23) that ￿food processing declines in all EU countries￿. 
11 For more on this see Barry, Gorg and McDowell (2002).   10 
Table 5: Cross-Border M&A Activity by sector, average annual share 1993-1999: (i) 
by EU firms, (ii) with CEE countries and (iii) by Irish indigenous firms 
Sector Cross-border 
M&A purchases 
by EU firms 
worldwide 
Cross-border M&A 
sales in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
Cross-border M&A 
purchases by Irish firms 
Food, Drink and Agribusiness  5.9  17.00  17.5 
Print, paper and publishing  2.8  0.52  16.2 
IT, Telecommunications and  
Electronics
12 
5.1 3.75  4 
Chemical and pharmac.  14.4  4.58  9.5 
Other Manufacturing  24.2  21.25  5.8 
Construction, property  1  0.53  22.2 
Financial services  32.3  25.50  22.5 
Services (consulting, retail, 
wholesale etc.)  
14.3 26.87  2.3 
Total  100                                 100  100 
Source: Barry, Gorg and McDowell (2002) from UNCTAD (2000) and CFM Capital  Acquisitions Survey 
(various years). 
 
Irish firms have clearly developed valuable proprietary assets in management skills, 
experience and reputation in these sectors, and should be well-positioned to develop these 
assets further in the expanding markets of Central and Eastern Europe.  Table 6 indicates 
that they have already begun to do so. 
 
Table 6: Acquisitions by Irish Indigenous Firms in Central and Eastern Europe 
Year Bidder  Target  Country  Sector   
Value 
Є000 
1993  Golden Vale  Vonk Pol  Poland  Food and drink  5969 
1996  IWP plc  Polbita (60%)  Poland  Distribution  3683 
1997  AIB  WBK to 60.1%  Poland  Financial Services  55118 
1998  CRH  Holding Cement Polski  Poland  Construction & property  29210 
1998  Kingspan  Sunip  Czech  Construction & property  8255 
1998  AIB  Chase Fund Mgt Polska  Poland  Financial services  N/D 
1999  AIB  Bank Zachodni (80% stake)  Poland  Financial services  563499 
1999  CRH  Cementownia Rejowiec  Poland  Construction & property  28105 
1999  CRH  Falbud  Poland  Construction & property  N/D 
1999  CRH  Mirbud (72.5% stake)  Poland  Construction & property  N/D 
1999  M’facturers Services (MSL) Phillips (Polish PCB division) Poland  IT & telecommunications  N/D 
2000  Barlo Group  PSC  Slovakia Print, paper & packaging  13589 
2000  CRH  Gozdnica  Poland  Construction & property  7239 
2000  CRH  Termo-Organika  Poland  Construction & property  N/D 
2000  CRH  Polbet (75%)  Poland  Construction & property  N/D 
2000  CRH  Creg (51%)  Poland  Construction & property  N/D 
2001  CRH  PRD Budostal  Poland  Construction & property  N/D 
 
 
                                                            
12 This sector comprises Electrical and Electronic Equipment and Precision Instruments. 
Source: Chapman Flood Mazars acquisition surveys. 
Note: N/D indicates value not disclosed.  11 
Nor is enlargement necessarily detrimental to the EU15 Textiles and Clothing sector, 
given the possibility of outsourcing to CEE countries.  Outsourcing entails splitting up 
the production process and importing intermediates which had formerly been sourced 
domestically.  This process allows for increased specialisation, generating further gains 
from trade liberalisation.  Austria￿s proximity to the CEE candidate countries means that 
outsourcing has advanced particularly rapidly in its case, and it has been found to be 
particularly important in less skill-intensive sectors including Wood Products and 
Textiles; Egger et al. (2001).
13  They find it to have been an important source of total 
factor productivity growth in these sectors, though overall welfare effects depend on the 
extent of labour-market flexibility in the outsourcing countries since it can otherwise lead 
to unemployment.  Other studies such as Anderton and Brenton (1999) find that 
outsourcing leads to an increase in both the wage-bill share and the employment share of 
skilled workers in companies located in the countries engaged in outsourcing.  It 
therefore represents a step upwards on the ladder of comparative advantage.      
 
2.  Implications for Inward FDI 
Enlargement will considerably enhance the attractiveness of the CEE countries as a 
location for export-oriented foreign direct investment, and as such will allow them 
compete more strongly for such investments.  This will arise even though there is already 
almost complete free trade in manufactures between the EU and the CEEC.   
 
Foreign investors are unlikely to see free trade as equivalent to EU membership for a 
number of reasons.  First is the fact that efforts to remove any remaining non-tariff 
barriers  are likely to be pursued more vigorously in the case of intra-EU trade.  
Secondly, accession will increase the confidence of foreign investors by allowing for the 
possibility of appeal beyond the courts of the associated countries to those of the 
European Union in the event of legal disputes arising.  Thirdly, EU membership serves as 
some guarantee of transparency in the legal and business environment because of the 
acquis communitaire and the culture of checking the probity of Structural Funds 
                                                            
13 Proximity is also generally found to be an important factor behind outsourcing however, suggesting that 
Ireland￿s links with the CEEC along this dimension are unlikely to reach Austrian levels.   12 
expenditures, and fourthly, entry to the Single Market will fully remove customs frontiers 
and trade barriers associated with differing technical standards, and will allow full access 
to government procurement contracts throughout the EU.  For all of these reasons, 
accession is likely to represent as dramatic a change in the CEE climate for foreign 
investors as it did in the Irish case in 1973; Barry (2002).  
 
Will Ireland compete directly with the CEE countries for foreign investment?  There is 
some possibility that this could arise.  A number of them have followed Ireland￿s lead in 
offering low rates of corporation tax, and the more advanced ones do not differ 
substantially from Ireland in terms of the skill levels of the population, while labour costs 
in CEE countries are very much lower.  Furthermore, the productivity level of the 
workforce is arguably endogenous, reflecting success or failure at attracting FDI, rather 
than an exogenous factor that determines the likelihood of success or failure in this 
regard.  Upon accession, several at least of the CEE countries will have equally easy 
access to the high-income markets of Western Europe and are likely to enjoy equally 
stable macro policy environments and equivalent regulatory and public administration 
systems.  This opens up the possibility that they might compete directly with Ireland for 
the type of FDI that Ireland has been successful in attracting thus far; Barry and Hannan 
(2001). 
 
As against this however, previous episodes of  trade liberalisation in Europe have 
increased the pool of FDI both from within Europe and from outside; Dunning (1997a, 
1997b).  The goods produced by multinational firms also tend to have relatively high 
income elasticities of demand so that the expected growth in the CEEC10 consequent on 
enlargement should generate further flows of FDI into and within the newly expanded 
EU; Barry and Hannan (2002b).  A further relevant detail is that the Single Market 
liberalisation was associated with an expansion in the average number of plants that the 
leading multinational firms in the EU maintained. Among such firms with plants in 
Ireland for example, the average number of other EU countries in which they maintained 
plants rose from 3 in 1987 to 5 in 1993; Pavelin (2000).  This suggests that the 
development of the Single Market was associated with a further fragmentation of the   13 
production chain.  If this proves to be the case it will be efficiency-enhancing and should 
operate to the further benefit of Ireland￿s foreign-owned industry. 
 
What is the evidence on this so far?  Some indications can be gleaned from an analysis of 
Ireland￿s trade linkages with CEE countries in the sub-sectors of Irish manufacturing that 
are predominantly foreign-owned.  The trade (SITC) sectors that are largely foreign-
owned, according to the Irish output and employment data, are:  Pharmaceuticals (SITC 
54), Office and Data Processing Equipment (SITC 75), Telecommunications Equipment 
(SITC 76), Electrical Machinery, Apparatus and Appliances (SITC 77) and Professional 
and Optical Instruments (SITC 87/8). 
 
Ireland has a substantial trade surplus against each of the CEE countries in 
Pharmaceuticals and  Professional and Optical Instruments; Tables 7a and 7b.
14   Office 
and Data Processing is different.  Here Ireland has a strong trade surplus against each of 
the economies other than Hungary, with which it has a large deficit.  The reasons for this 
are interesting and will be discussed below.  A similar though less dramatic situation 
prevails in Telecommunications. In Electrical Machinery and Equipment Ireland ran a 
deficit against Poland in 1999 and against the Czech Republic in 2000. 
 
 
Table 7a: Ireland￿s trade with selected CEE countries in Ireland￿s foreign-
dominated sectors, 1999 
1999 (euro 000)  Hungary  Czech Rep  Poland  Estonia 
  Ir X   Ir M   Ir X   Ir M   Ir X   Ir M   Ir X   Ir M  
Total trade  162,586  243,714  203,169 62,662  254,021  87,612  9851  6427 
54 (Md/pharm)  3305 1182 5769  60  11,148  13 174  0 
75 (ODP)  43,871 210,542  81,372  2858 100,234  2512  5713  60 
76 (Telecomm)  2214 13,088 44,140  6747 12,040 6934  488  23 
77 (Elec)  10,926 6281 3239 2618 4010  6748 273  1 
87/8 (Prof/opt)  742 224  1918 107  1230  132 95  0 
Source: CSO Trade Statistics 
 
 
                                                            
14 We include data on Estonia as well as on Ireland￿s main trading partners in the region given the emerging 
strength of its telecommunications sector, based largely on overseas production by Finnish firm Nokia.   14 
Table 7b: Ireland￿s trade with selected CEE countries in Ireland￿s foreign-
dominated sectors, 2000 
 
2000 (euro 000)  Hungary  Czech Rep  Poland  Estonia 
  Ir X   Ir M   Ir X   Ir M   Ir X   Ir M   Ir X   Ir M  
Total trade  224,356 299,658  346,546 109,862 361,020 102,625  25,669  15,831 
54 (Md/pharm)  5145 1310  12414  118  18,973  14 106  1 
75 (ODP)  49,485 240,031 100,623  5802 130,058  1982  6949  76 
76 (Telecomm)  3229 19,952  119,621 13,768 25,090  7455  654  975 
77 (Elec)  38,985 15,022  6678  8006  9965  8525 7525  323 
87/8 (Prof/opt)  512 389  2499 118  1847 177 31  0 
Source: CSO Trade Statistics 
 
 
We will concentrate primarily on Irish-Hungarian trade links in Office and Data 
Processing Equipment (SITC Division 75), as this is Ireland￿s main export sector, while 
Hungary has the most advanced foreign-owned and export-oriented ODP sector amongst 
the CEE countries. 
 
Ireland had an overall trade surplus in the Office and Data Processing sector (SITC 
Division 75) in the late 1980s and this situation continues to prevail today.  Hungary by 
contrast had a trade deficit in the earlier period, but runs a surplus now with the rest of 
the world, with a substantial surplus also against Ireland.  The proposition we want to 
explore is whether  Hungary￿s growing strength is threatening Ireland￿s position in the 
ODP sector. 
 
Looking at Ireland￿s trade with the rest of the world in Office and Data Processing 
Machinery, but disaggregated now down to 5-digit SITC headings, we see that the 
important import and export sectors (i.e. comprising exports or imports of over 1 billion 
euro in any of the years 1999, 2000 or 2001) in recent years are as shown in Table 8, 
while the equivalent position for 1990 (for sectors trading more than £100 million at the 




   15 
Table 8: Ireland￿s external trade in SITC Division 75  
(Office and Data Processing Machinery),  recent period  
SITC heading  Exports    Imports 
752.20  √ >  √ 
752.30  √    
752.60     √ 
752.70  √ =  √ 
752.90     √ 
759.97  √√ >  √√ 
      
Source: Unpublished CSO Trade Statistics 
Legend: A √ implies an important sector; √√ implies the most important export and/or import sector, and > 
implies exports greater than imports. 
 
 
Table 9: Ireland￿s external trade in SITC Division 75  
(Office and Data Processing Machinery),  1990  
SITC heading  Exports    Imports 
752.20  √    
752.30  √ >  √ 
752.60     √ 
752.70     √ 
752.90      
759.97  √√ >  √√ 
      
Source: Unpublished CSO Trade Statistics 
Legend: A √ implies an important sector; √√ implies the most important export and/or import sector, and > 
implies exports greater than imports. 
 
 
Thus Ireland has remained a net exporter of segments 752.20, 752.30 and particularly 
759.97, while tending to be a net importer of  752.60, 752.70 and 752.90. 
 
Ireland runs an overall trade surplus with the rest of the world in SITC 752 and 759, 
while Hungary runs a surplus with the rest of the world in 752 and a deficit in 759.  It  
comes as little surprise therefore that the vast bulk of Irish imports from Hungary are in 
SITC 752.60 and SITC 752.70, sub-sectors in which Ireland has always tended to run 
trade deficits with the rest of the world, while the vast bulk of Ireland￿s exports to 
Hungary and the other CEE countries are in SITC 759.97, which is Ireland￿s major export 
sub-sector in the ODP industry.  This suggests that Ireland￿s trade with Hungary in ODP-  16 
related products are in complementary rather than substitute goods; i.e. that Ireland and 
Hungary form part of the same value-added chain in these products.
15  
 
Rather than displacing Ireland, Hungary  has instead displaced other countries in entering 
the value-added chain of which Ireland￿s foreign-owned sector comprises one part.
16 
 
What of the Ireland￿s other foreign-dominated sectors?  In Telecommunications, the 
Czech Republic is Ireland￿s leading CEE export market, while Ireland again has a trade 
deficit with Hungary in these products.  The bulk of Ireland￿s exports in this case arise in 
subsectors 764.17 and 764.93 while most of Ireland￿s imports from Hungary are in 
subsector 763.81, again suggesting that Ireland and Hungary are producing 
complementary rather than competing products. 
 
In Electrical Machinery, most of Ireland￿s exports go to Hungary but the country has run 
trade deficits in the recent past with both the Czech Republic and Poland.  Analysis of the 
disaggregated data again shows that Ireland￿s exports to CEE countries and imports from 
these countries tend to be in different sub-sectors. 
 
These data indicate that fears of direct competition between Ireland and the CEE 
countries within sub-categories of FDI may be overstated.  One cannot be overly  
sanguine about this however as we know from the analysis of pre-EU accession Irish data 
that the measures of revealed comparative advantage which underlie this relatively 
optimistic assessment will not necessarily serve as accurate predictors of the post-
enlargement environment if the pattern of FDI flows changes; Barry and Hannan (2002a).   
 
If the more pessimistic scenario in which CEE countries divert FDI flows away from 
Ireland does come to appear likely, what steps could the Irish authorities take to counter 
                                                            
15 In terms of Irish-Hungarian intra-industry trade in section 759.97, the unit values (per tonne) have been 
consistently higher for Irish exports, indicating the simultaneous import of lower-quality and export of 
higher quality products within Ireland￿s main export sub-sector.  
16 As to which countries were displaced: in 1989/90 43 percent of imports to Ireland of  SITC 752.60 and 
SITC 752.70 products came from Western Europe, 32 percent from the US and 25 percent from Asia.  In   17 
the threat?  One part of the required response would focus on cost competitiveness.  It is 
clear that a major factor behind increased wage demands in Ireland in recent years is the 
price of housing.  The government could consider more radical solutions to the problem 
than were embraced in the various Bacon reports on house prices.
17   The other elements 
of the response are in more traditional areas of industrial policy.  If the computer sector 
for example appeared to be in danger of relocating dramatically to some of the new EU 
member states, the development agencies could seek to narrow Ireland￿s specialisation 
into certain niche stages of the production and development process.  The other necessity 
would be to focus more strongly on capturing new sunrise industries as they emerge into 
the international arena, which is consistent with the strategy advocated in the ForfÆs 
document Enterprise 2010.     
 
3. Migration  Issues 
Enlargement brings with it the possibility of substantial migration flows from CEE 
countries to the EU15.  Most studies that have been carried out suggest however that the 
inflow of migrants will in fact be quite modest for countries other than Germany and 
Austria, and that even in these latter countries the economic effects will not be 
substantial. Nevertheless, the EU incumbents generally favour only a gradual opening up 
of labour markets, in the knowledge that ongoing convergence in living standards will 
make migration a less desirable option.  There is indeed a precedent for such a transition 
period; while Greece acceded to the EU in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986, labour 
mobility was restricted until 1988 in the former case and until 1992 in the latter. 
 
Estimates of likely migration patterns take into account income differences, distances and 
traditional ties between sending and receiving economies, the states of the relevant labour 
markets, the demographic profile of the home-country population, and the existence of 
emigrant networks.  On the basis of analysis of previous migration experiences between 
e.g. Southern and Northern Europe or Eastern and Western Germany, results are then 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2000/01 by contrast, 39 percent came from Western Europe, only 8 percent from the US, 50 percent from 
Asia and 3 percent from Hungary.  This sub-sector of industry was therefore migrating from west to east. 
17 One such is to increase densities considerably by easing height restrictions in new housing developments, 
and to build up state-owned land banks purchased at non-rezoned agricultural-use prices.   18 
extrapolated, mutatis mutandis, to the post-accession situation prevailing between the 
CEEC10 and the EU15. 
 
The percentage of the population of the CEEC10 of employable age is generally higher 
than is the case for Germany, current unemployment rates are rather similar, and income 
and wage differences are of course large.  Studies generally find that the largest 
emigration rates can be expected from Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, mainly because of 
their relatively high income disadvantages.  Of these, the Poles are generally better 
prepared for emigration, in terms of educational qualifications and access to emigrant 
networks. 
Consensus estimates suggest that no more than 3 million Central and Eastern Europeans 
will migrate to Western Europe over the next 15 to 20 years. This would comprise 1 
percent of the EU population and 2 to 3 percent of the CEEC population.
18  Studies 
indicate a maximum of 335,000 immigrants to the West in the first year, falling to an 
annual flow of 100,000 in the medium term, based on an assumed convergence of 2 
percent per annum between CEE10 and EU income levels and no strong changes in 
unemployment differentials.  Most of these inflows, furthermore, will go to Germany and 
Austria, which are the end location for over 80 percent of CEE migrants at present.  
 
On the basis of the Irish numbers however, these studies appear to us to underestimate the 
likely immigration flows.  By the early 2000s CEE immigrants already comprised around 
0.7% of the Irish population, even though immigration rules were quite restrictive.   
There were over 15,500 CEE immigrants on work permits in 2001 while there had been a 
cumulative 11,500 applications from CEE citizens for refugee status between 1998 and 
2002.




                                                            
18 Boeri et al. (2000); Fertig and Schmidt (2000); Bauer and Zimmermann (1999); Lejour et al. (2001). 
19 By contrast Boeri et al (2000; part A, page 127), the most widely cited study on the immigration 
implications of enlargement, predict the stock of CEE resident in Ireland to rise from a figure of 200 that 
they quote for 1998 to a total of 900 by 2030!   19 
 
Table 10: CEE Immigration to Ireland 





Bulgaria 518 410 
Czech 1454  735 
Estonia 1072 164 
Hung 557  46 
Latvia 4365  223 
Lith 2909  638 
Poland 2497  1400 
Romania 1776  7763 
Slovakia 465  193 
Slovenia 11  0 
Total CEE  15624  11572 
 
Data sources: Work permit numbers from Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment; asylum 
seeker numbers from Department of Justice. 
 
 
The impact of immigration on host-country labour markets and incomes per head will 
depend primarily on immigrant skill levels relative to the indigenous population.  If skill 
levels are equivalent, then with international capital mobility the effects are minimal.  If 
immigrants are less skilled, the distribution of income becomes less equitable as 
downward pressure is exerted on the unskilled wage.  Unemployment may also rise, as it  
tends to be concentrated among the less skilled.  The net fiscal costs of immigration will 
also be larger as unskilled immigrants use more government services and pay less tax.  
All of these effects are reversed of course if immigrants are more highly skilled than the 
indigenous population, though it must be noted that immigrants frequently work in 
occupations that do not fully employ their qualifications. 
 
The studies cited above suggest that these effects on EU15 labour markets, whether 
positive or negative, will all be small, because of the modest increase in population size 
envisaged.  There will also be a modest drop in the EU15 terms of trade because of the 
expansion of output that immigration will generate. Several studies suggest that German   20 




These studies, understandably, do not focus much attention on Ireland, given that they do 
not predict substantial flows of workers into this country.  Immigrant flows into the Irish 
labour force over the 1990s are known to have been relatively highly skilled, however. 
Suggested reasons for this include the fact that more highly educated people will have 
more information about Ireland as a destination, and relatively high income inequality 
levels may attract a higher ratio of skilled workers.  The skill mix in turn has been found 
to have contributed to the slowdown in earnings inequality growth.
21  One can only 
speculate as to whether this same skill mix will continue to prevail upon EU enlargement. 
 
One finding from Germany that may be of interest however, given current cost over-runs 
in implementing the National Development Plan, is that temporary migration possibilities 
afforded to CEE construction workers were found to have increased competition 
substantially in the sector through increased subcontracting to CEEC firms; Boeri et al. 
(2000). 
 
4.  Macroeconomic and Budgetary Issues 
Some commentators have suggested that the scale and effects of the CEEC10 
enlargement can be gauged by reflecting on the experience of German reunification, 
implying that enlargement might involve substantial deficit spending and rising interest 
rates.  This is most unlikely to happen because the scale of budgetary support offered will 
be much less than in the case of German reunification.   
 
Several analyses have come up with estimates of a net cost of enlargement to the EU 
budget of around 20 billion euro per annum.  The Berlin summit of 1999 earmarked a 
sum of 14.2 billion euro (in 1999 prices) for accession-related expenditures in 2006.  This 
                                                            
20 Bauer and Zimmermann (1999); Lejour et al. (2001). 
21 Barrett et al. (2000).   21 
would leave another 12.8 billion euro for further potential expenditures without violating 
the existing ceiling on the EU budget, which is set at 1.27 percent of EU GNP. 
 
The main expenditure items in the EU budget are the Common Agricultural Policy, 
accounting for around half of the budget, and the Structural (and Cohesion) Funds which 
account for a further 30 percent or so. Negotiations are ongoing as to how the candidate 
countries will be treated on both these issues. The Commission wishes to cap structural 
assistance to any accession country at 4 percent of its GDP, for example, and to 
commence direct income subsidies to CEEC10 farmers at 25 percent of those paid to 




The 20 billion euro estimate is broadly consistent with this position.  Baldwin, Francois 
and Portes (1997) assume that Structural Funds expenditures will be  capped at 5 percent 
of CEE GDP.
23   If average CAP payments per EU farmer were extended to CEE farmers, 
the cost could come to around 40 billion euro (in 1994 prices).  The productivity of CEE 
agriculture is very low however, so if payments were allocated per hectare instead the 
cost would be reduced substantially, to around 10 billion euro for the Visegrad 4 (Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland).  Summing these lower costs and subtracting a 
contribution of 1 percent of candidate countries￿ GDP generates a figure of less than 20 
billion euro for these 4 countries; Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997).
24 
 
An alternative approach is followed de la Fuente and DomØnech (2001).  They calculate 
that the redistributive impact of the total EU budget is equivalent to a subsidy or tax of 
5.76 percent of the difference (in purchasing power terms) between an EU citizen￿s gross 
income and EU average income.  If this degree of redistribution were maintained and 
                                                            
22 In addition, it argues that  reference levels for quotas should be set so as to reflect actual production 
levels in the period 1995-1999 (as opposed to potential levels).  
23 If Structural Funds payments were instead allocated per capita at around Greek and Portuguese levels, 
transfers would amount to between 10 and 15 percent of GNP for the four or five richest CEE countries, 
and to substantially more for the poorer states. 
24 It is important to note however that regardless of agreements reached in the near future over reform of 
the CAP and Structural Funds programmes,  further renegotiations will occur in the wake of EU   22 
extended to new member states the required transfers to CEE countries would sum to 
19.5 billion euro or one-quarter of one percent of EU15 GDP; CEPR (2002). 
 
Based on the current sharing of budgetary costs and benefits across EU member states, 
Ireland￿s contribution would be around 200 million euro, which is quite manageable.
25  
The cost to Ireland escalates dramatically however when costs and benefits are 
redistributed within the EU in line with current income levels.  It is well known that 
Germany bears a disproportionate share of the current burden while countries like Ireland 
and France contribute substantially less than the figure warranted by their current income 
levels. Over time it has to be envisaged that a more equitable sharing of the burden will 
be negotiated among EU member states. de la Fuente and DomØnech (2001) calculate 
that Ireland is currently oversubsidised to the tune of 2 billion euro per annum.  Given 
that the budgetary costs of enlargement will raise the profile of this item on the EU 
agenda, there may be a very substantial change over time in the flow of funds between 
Ireland and the rest of the EU. 
 
The implications of these developments for the Irish exchequer will depend on how CAP 
reform proceeds.  The present operation of the CAP entails a subsidy to farmers from 
Irish consumers as well as EU taxpayers.
26   This element of income redistribution is not 
done via the Irish exchequer, and its removal as part of CAP reform would not have 
exchequer implications.  Redistributing the burden of agricultural subsidies back onto 
member-state governments would have major implications however.  
 
The temporal dimension to these issues also needs to be borne in mind. Structural 
funding to CEE countries will be phased in only gradually, and, while it is being phased 
in, the CEE countries are likely to be converging on the EU15 in terms of income per 
head.  This will reduce the need for transfers.  EU budgetary reform, if and when it 
comes, will also be phased in over a reasonably long period of time. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
enlargement.  Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997) offer some speculations as to the voting coalitions likely 
to emerge at this time.  
25 Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997) and CEPR (2002) concur in this estimate. 
26 See Matthews (2001).   23 
 
While the  EU will clearly take great care to ensure that the budgetary and interest rate 
costs of enlargement are less than those entailed by German reunification, an EU-wide 
fiscal expansion would nevertheless exert upward pressure on interest rates, as could 
moves to hasten the entry of the candidate countries into EMU.  We complete this section 
by looking at the sectoral implications for the Irish economy of such possible 
macroeconomic developments.   
 
In its report on the economic implications for Ireland of participation in EMU, ESRI 
(1996) identified certain sectors of the Irish economy that  are particularly vulnerable to 
high interest rates.  Such vulnerability was argued to depends both on product 
characteristics and on industrial structure.  Durable goods, occasional purchases, house-
building materials and construction are all likely to be quite sensitive for example, while  
firms in low-margin sectors or with high levels of indebtedness will also be particularly 
vulnerable.  Within manufacturing, the most sensitive sectors according to the ESRI 
analysis included Non-Metallic Minerals;  Textiles, Clothing and Footwear; Wood and 
Furniture; Paper and Printing; Rubber and Plastics, and some segments of Food, Drink 
and Tobacco. 
 
It is noteworthy that these are all low-technology sectors and all have declined as a share 
of manufacturing (and total) employment since the ESRI study was carried out. This 
suggests that Irish manufacturing employment is now less vulnerable to high interest 
rates, even if these should arise as a consequence of enlargement, than was the case even 
a decade ago. 
 
Conclusions 
Enlargement will have important economic implications for Ireland. Trade expansion for 
example seems certain.  Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997) estimate that Ireland will 
receive 0.3 percent of the total gains from trade accruing to the EU15.
27   Most Irish 
export sectors will gain.  The Western European sectors threatened by enlargement are   24 
generally agreed to include Food Processing and Textiles, Clothing and Footwear.  Our 
analysis suggests that the Irish food processing sector is in fact likely to gain, as it 
produces a very different range of products from those into which the CEE countries will 
specialise. We expect that Irish companies in this and a number of other sectors will, on 
the basis of proprietary assets in management and sectoral experience, engage in outward 
FDI into Central and Eastern Europe.  The development of trade with the CEEC will also 
offer outsourcing possibilities, particularly in labour-intensive sectors such as Textiles 
and Clothing.  Most conventional trade analyses do not take these possibilities into 
account in assessing gains from further market integration. 
 
While Ireland￿s foreign-owned sector stands to gain substantially from the opening up of  
export opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe, there is also the possibility that 
enlargement will divert inward FDI away from Ireland.  There is no sign that anything of 
this nature has happened as yet however. In fact our analysis shows that Ireland and 
Hungary currently trade complementary Office and Data Processing  products, and that 
Hungarian exports to Ireland represent one link in a value chain that generates strong 
Irish exports to the rest of the world. Further fragmentation of the value-added chain may 
be as likely an outcome as the diversion of FDI flows away from Ireland. 
 
Enlargement will also open up the possibility of labour migration. Most studies estimate 
that inflows will be quite modest, summing to perhaps 1 percent of the EU15 population 
by the year 2030. The vast majority of these migrants will go to Germany  and Austria.  
The impact on wages and living standards will depend on the skills of the migrants, but if 
inflows are as modest as studies suggest, these effects will be fairly negligible. 
 
Finally, we looked at the macroeconomic and budgetary implications of enlargement. 
The consensus estimate is that the process in the early years will cost around 20 billion 
euro per annum, and the European Commission has budgeted for an amount close to this.  
On the basis of current net transfers Ireland￿s share of this cost would come to around 
200 million euro, and these costs would ultimately fall as CEE living standards converge 
                                                                                                                                                                             
27 They estimate the EU15 gain at a modest 11.2 billion ecu (at 1992 prices).   25 
on those in the EU15.  A root and branch review of the distribution of the EU budget 
would cost the country around 10 times this amount, which reflects the extent to which 
the country is oversubsidised at present, given its relative level of income.  
 
Even if the narrowly-defined economic benefits for EU incumbents turn out to be quite 
modest it is important to remember, as Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997) point out, 
that the outcome of the narrow economic calculus employed here pales into 
insignificance when evaluated against the larger implications of enlargement.  Eastwards 
expansion of the EU is primarily about the security and stability of the continent and the 
reconstruction of Europe￿s post-Cold War political architecture.  
   26 
References 
Anderton, B., and P. Brenton (1999) ￿Outsourcing and Low-Skilled Workers in the UK￿, 
Bulletin of Economic Research, 51 (4), 267-285. 
 
Baldwin, R.E., J.F. Francois and R. Portes (1997) ￿The Costs and Benefits of Eastern 
Enlargement: the Impact on the EU and Central Europe￿, Economic Policy 24, 125-176. 
 
Barrett, A., J. FitzGerald and B. Nolan (2000) ￿Earnings Inequality, Returns to Education 
and Immigration into Ireland￿, IZA Discussion Paper N0. 167, Bonn, Germany, 
forthcoming in Labour Economics. 
 
Barry, F. (2002) "EU Accession and Prospective FDI Flows to CEE Countries", in R. 
Lipsey (ed.)  Foreign Direct Investment in the Real  and Financial Sector of Industrial 
Countries, Frankfurt: Deutsche Bundesbank, (forthcoming). 
 
Barry, F., Gorg, H. and A. McDowell (2002) ￿Outward FDI and the Investment 
Development Path of a Late-Industrialising Economy: Evidence from Ireland￿, Regional 
Studies (forthcoming). 
 
Barry, F., and A. Hannan (2001) ￿Will Enlargement Threaten Ireland￿s FDI Inflows?￿,  
Quarterly Economic Commentary; Dublin: ESRI. 
 
Barry, F., and A. Hannan (2002a) ￿FDI and the Predictive Powers of Revealed 
Comparative Advantage Indicators￿, unpublished ms, University College Dublin. 
 
Barry, F., and A. Hannan (2002b) ￿Product Characteristics and the Growth of FDI￿, 
unpublished ms, University College Dublin. 
 
Bauer, T. and K. Zimmermann (1999) ￿Assessment of Possible Migration Pressure and 
its Labour Market impact Following EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, IZA 
Research Report No. 3, Bonn. 
 
Boeri, T., H. Br￿cker et al. (2000) ￿The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Employment 
and Labour Markets in the EU Member States￿.  Final Report to European Commission; 
available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/empl&esf/enlargement_en.htm 
(A summary is also available as ￿Eastern Enlargement and EU-labour markets: 
Perceptions, Challenges and Opportunities￿, forthcoming in World Economy). 
 
Brulhart, M., and M. Kelly (1999) ￿Ireland￿s Trading Potential with Central and Eastern 
European Countries: A Gravity Study￿, Economic and Social Review, 30 (2), 159-174. 
 
CEPR (2002) Who’s Afraid of the Big Enlargement?, Policy Paper No. 7, Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, London. 
   27 
de la Fuente, A., and R. Domenech (2001) The Redistributive Effects of the EU Budget: 
An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, Journal of Common Market Studies., 39 (2), 307-
30. 
 
Dunning, J. (1997a) The European Internal Market Programme and Inbound Foreign 
Direct Investment, part 1, Journal of Common Market Studies, 35, 1, 1-30. 
 
Dunning, J. (1997b) The European Internal Market Programme and Inbound Foreign 
Direct Investment, part 2, Journal of Common Market Studies, 35, 2, 189-223. 
 
Egger, P., M. Pfaffermayr and Y. Wolfmayr-Schnitzer (2001) ￿The International 
Fragmentation of Austrian Manufacturing: the Effects of Outsourcing on Productivity 
and Wages￿ The North American Journal of Economics and Finance 12, 257-27. 
 
ESRI (1996) Economic Implications for Ireland of EMU, Policy Research Paper No. 28; 
Dublin: ESRI. 
 
Fertig M. and C. Schmidt (2000) ￿Aggregate-level Migration Studies as a Tool for 
Forecasting Future Migration Streams￿, IZA Discussion paper No. 183, Bonn, Germany.  
 
Ferto, I, and L. J. Hubbard (2001) ￿Intra-Industry Trade in Agri-Food Products between 
Hungary and the EU￿, available at: 
http://www.mek.iif.hu/porta/szint/tarsad/kozgazd/elmelet/nyarimuh/html/ferto.pdf 
 
ForfÆs (2001) Statement on Outward Direct Investment.  
 
ForfÆs (2000) Enterprise 2010 
 
Francois, J., and M. Rombout (2001) ￿Trade Effects from the Integration of the Central 
and East European Countries into the European Union￿, Sussex European Institute 
Working Paper 41. 
 
Henrichsmeyer, W., J. K￿ckler, T. M￿llmann and A. Quiring (2000) ￿Development of a 
Policy Information System for Agricultural Sectors in Transition Countries￿, chapter 2 in  
S. Tangermann and M. Banse (eds) Central and Eastern European Agriculture in an 
Expanding European Union, Manchester: CABI; available at: 
http://www.cabi-publishing.org/Bookshop/Readingroom/0851994253.asp 
 
Lejour, A., R. de Mooij and R. Nahuis (2001)  ￿EU Enlargement: Economic Implications 
for Countries and Industries￿, Central Planning Bureau of the Netherlands,  Working 
Paper No. 585. http://www.ifo.de/pls/ifo_app/CESifoSwitch?setPage=ifoinstitute.htm 
 
Matthews, A. (2000) ￿Agriculture, Food Safety and Rural Development￿, chapter 9 in J. 
O￿Hagan, ed., The Economy of Ireland, 8
th edition, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. 
   28 
Matthews, A. (2001) ￿How Important is Agriculture and the Agri-Food Sector in 
Ireland?￿, Irish Banking Review, Winter. 
   
Pavelin, S. (2000) ￿The Geographical Diversification of Leading Firms in the EU￿, 
Centre for Economic Research Working Paper 15, University College Dublin. 
 
Stolwijk, H. (2000) ￿The Dutch Food and Agricultural Sectors and the Enlargement of 
the EU￿, Netherlands Central Planning Bureau Report 2000/1. 
 
UNCTAD (2000) World Investment Report. 
 